In a forthcoming paper, Guido Lorenzoni writes about inefficient credit booms. Here is the abstract:
This paper studies the welfare properties of competitive equilibria in an economy with ﬁnancial frictions hit by aggregate shocks. In particular, it shows that competitive ﬁnancial contracts can result in excessive borrowing ex ante and excessive volatility ex post. Even though, from a ﬁrst-best perspective the equilibrium always displays under-borrowing, from a second-best point of view excessive borrowing can arise. The ineﬃciency is due to the combination of limited commitment in ﬁnancial contracts and the fact that asset prices are determined in a spot market. This generates a pecuniary externality that is not internalized in private contracts. The model provides a framework to evaluate preventive policies which can be used during a credit boom to reduce the expected costs of a ﬁnancial crisis.
Sounds a bit Austrian. Here is a link to a non-gated version of the paper.